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Abstract
An important characteristic deﬁning the threat of environmental
crises is the uncertainty about their consequences for future welfare.
Random processes governing ecosystem dynamics and adaptation to
anthropogenic change are important sources of prevailing ecological
uncertainty and contribute to the problem of how to balance economic
development against natural resource conservation. The aim of this
study is to examine optimal growth subject to non-linear dynamic en-
vironmental constraints. In a two-sector exogenous growth framework
we model a stochastic environmental good, exhibiting uncertain eco-
logical responses to environmental change, and describe the economic
and environmental trade-oﬀs that ensue for a risk-averse social plan-
ner. Allowing for ecological risk tends to slow economic growth if en-
vironmental impacts are assumed to increase exponentially as the rate
of disturbance increases. Taken in isolation the eﬀects of ecosystem
resilience and ecological uncertainty on the rate of natural resource de-
velopment are ambiguous and depend on normative parameters such
as the social planner’s attitude to risk and rate of time preference.
∗The authors thank Timo Goeschl for suggesting the potential use of speciﬁc biological
population models in this analysis.
†Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, UK.
‡Department of Economics, University of Melbourne.
11 Introduction
T h ea i mo ft h i sp a p e ri st oc h a r a c t e r i s et h et r a d e - o ﬀs between economic
growth and natural resource conservation by determining the optimal rate of
conversion of a natural reserve of land. Land conversion fuels consumption
growth in the private sector, while simultaneously giving rise to uncertain
environmental consequences, accounted for in terms of biodiversity beneﬁts
and modelled as non-linear stochastic processes.1 By modelling uncertainty
explicitly in this way and allowing for decision-making to take non-linear
economic-ecological dynamics into account, we build on existing literature
on environmental constraints to economic growth. Krautkraemer (1998)
found that allowing for deterministic environmental constraints in a model
with exogenous technological progress reduces steady-state economic growth.
Analysing the conditions necessary to attain an ecologically sustainable and
balanced growth path, Hofkes (1996) showed that these relate to production
and substitution elasticities as well as the function describing the dynamic
relationship between the economic and the ecological system. Barrett (1992)
concluded that normative parameters such as concerns for preservation and
the welfare of future generations determine to a great extent the degree of
environmental sacriﬁce for economic growth.
The importance for biological diversity and ecosystem resilience of rates
of change of land use follows from ecological studies on extinction debt by
Tilman et al. (1994) and Seabloom et al. (2002), whereby habitat destruction
results in an increased number of species populations for which the threshold
conditions for survival are no longer met.2 Without habitat restoration or
1A number of economic studies of ecosystems examine the problem of prevailing eco-
logical uncertainty. On the simulation of non-linear and stochastic ecosystem dynamics,
see Carpenter and Cottingham (1997) and Perrings and Walker (1995).
2A number of studies focusing on economic-ecological aspects of biodiversity conserva-
tion model biodiversity as deterministic species-area relationships without allowing for the
dynamic interaction between disturbance caused by land conversion and in situ biodiver-
sity; see for example Smulders et al. (2004) and Polasky et al. (2004). On the economics of
species extinction see Swanson (1994), and on the disturbance aspect of logging on tropical
forests, see Chapman and Fimbel (2001). Swallow (1990) explored the economics of de-
pleting a nonrenewable natural resource which supports an interdependent and renewable
natural resource.
2species phenotypic evolution, such species face local extinction with a high
probability in the near future. The time lag between the conversion of land
and extinction debt becoming an observable cost of land conversion gives
rise to uncertainty. In addition, Hanski and Ovaskainen (2002) argued that
faster rates of land conversion are likely to result in greater extinction debts
and loss of ecosystem resilience, with the precise magnitude of these eﬀects
also subject to greater uncertainty.3 We model the ecological processes of
extinction debt as the uncertain outcome of a race between demographic
stochasticity and evolutionary rescue, expressed as a function of the rate of
change to which the ecosystem is exposed.
In the model, extinction debt does not directly aﬀect the production of
a private good, which can be consumed or invested in the form of capital
which, along with land, is required for production.4 However, it has negative
consequences for biodiversity, which is valued as a public good. In order to
concentrate on the explicit modelling of ecological uncertainty, the beneﬁts
arising from the private consumption good are assumed to be known with
certainty. The economic and environmental trade-oﬀs facing a risk-averse so-
cial planner over an inﬁnite horizon are examined. The concept of ecological
risk modelled here is closely related to the notion of environmental option
value — the value attributed to the option of preserving a given environmental
resource in the face of uncertainty. This paper treats environmental option
value as a risk premium in the sense of Ciccetti and Freeman (1971).
Section 2 constructs the two-sector growth model, which describes the in-
teraction between private sector growth and a stochastically dynamic natural
resource in the public good sector. Section 3 considers the two components
which comprise the arguments in the social welfare function. The trade-oﬀs
and policy choices of a risk-averse social planner are examined in section 4,
where sensitivity analyses are carried out using numerical examples. Con-
clusions are in section 5.
3See Perrings (1998) for an exposition on the link between ecosystem states and their
resilience to altered environmental conditions.
4This diﬀers from the analysis in Hofkes (1996), where the ecological resource plays a
role in the private good production sector.
32T h e F r a m e w o r k o f A n a l y s i s
The model consists of three principal components. First, a public good sec-
tor consisting of a natural resource, reserve land, gives rise to biodiversity
beneﬁts. Second, a private good, which may be used for consumption or
investment purposes, is produced in what may be thought of as an agri-
cultural sector. The third component is a planner who maximises a social
welfare function deﬁned in terms of the expected present values of private
and public good beneﬁts. For the purpose of this model, human impact on
biodiversity is deﬁned as a function of the rate, v, at which reserve land is
converted for use in the private sector. The planner is regarded as making
an optimal choice of v. These three principal components are discussed in
subsections 2.1 to 2.3.
The economy is initially endowed with capital of K0 and easily accessible
reserve land, R0 =1 , which is rich in biodiversity. Biodiversity reserve land
may be converted for use in production.5 Let L(t) denote the land stock in
the private sector at time, t, used in the production of a private good, and
let R(t) denote the reserve land at t (with R(0) = R0), following conversion






2.1 The Private Good Sector
Production in the private (agricultural) sector gives rise to a single good,
X(t). Population and labour supply are assumed to remain constant, and




5Natural resource development is motivated by domestic consumption and production
growth as opposed to exploiting trade opportunities as in Smulders et al. (2004)
6The focus here is on biodiversity in the forested reserve and not, as in Pascual et al.
(2003) on the biological diversity characterising agricultural land.
4where K(t) is the capital stock at time t and 0 <α<1. The output of
the private good sector at time t is divided into consumption, C(t),a n d
investment, I(t),s ot h a t :
X(t)=C(t)+I(t). (4)
The rate of capital depreciation is δ,w h e r e0 <δ<1. Thus, where ˙ K =
dK (t)/dt, the equation of motion of the capital stock is:
˙ K = I(t) − δK(t). (5)
An optimum proﬁle of investment and consumption must be determined,
conditional on the rate of conversion of reserve land. The optimum time
proﬁle of consumption, given v,i sd e ﬁned as ˆ C (t) a n di se x a m i n e df u r t h e r
in section 3.2 and the Appendix.
2.2 The Public Good Sector
Reserve land is essential for the conservation of biological diversity, which
is valued for its existence and option value, including its role in the ﬁght
against diseases and pathogens now and in the future. Furthermore, biologi-
cal diversity and resilience of ecosystems are known to be highly susceptible
to alterations to the environment. Within this context the extent and speed
of reserve land conversion and habitat loss are important. The former is
important as it determines the base, R(t), from which biodiversity beneﬁts
are drawn and the latter is valued for its role in determining population den-
sity, D(t), via its eﬀect on extinction debt and ecological resilience. In the
context of this model, biodiversity is represented by a bundle of populations,
exhibiting identical responses to environmental change over time.
Using Grummet and Stirzaker’s (1992) approach to measure biological
populations, the stock of biodiversity at time t, P(t),i sr e g a r d e da sap r o d u c t
of the population density, D(t), of a representative species and the size of
biodiversity reserve land, R(t), so that:
P(t)=D(t)R(t). (6)
5While R(t) reﬂects the stock eﬀect of reserve land conversion on biological
diversity, D(t) measures the ecological response to the loss of habitat and
associated disturbance levels. This response may be viewed as the outcome
of a race between two independent processes — demographic stochasticity and
evolutionary rescue, following Gomulkiewicz and Holt (1995). Higher rates of
land conversion, v, represent increased environmental disturbance associated
with less time to adapt to these changes. This may cause the current envi-
ronmental conditions to come dangerously close to the minimum threshold,
leaving species more susceptible to demographic stochasticity and increasing
the risk of extinction. In contrast, a counteracting ecological response exists,
whereby ecosystem disturbances stimulate phenotypic evolution.7
Biologists have developed birth-death models capable of approximating
such processes; see for example Grummet and Stirzaker (1992). Here a simple
birth-death process serves as the basis for modelling the representative species
population density in the public good sector over time. The probability
of species extinction, µ, is assumed to increase with rising rates of land
conversion for private good production, so that:
µ = f(v). (7)
The probability of evolutionary rescue is denoted by η. Assuming that the
extinction eﬀect dominates that of evolutionary rescue, η is assumed to be a
proportion of µ,s ot h a t :
η = βµ (8)
and 0 <β≤ 1. Using a Markov chain, Grummet and Stirzaker (1992) show
that the expected population density at time t, E(Dt), is a function of the
initial level of density, which evolves at an exponential rate such that:
E(Dt)=D0e
−(1−β)µt. (9)
If β =1 , the corresponding variance is given by:
V (Dt)=2 D0µt (10)
7Phenotypic evolution is the process by which a species, otherwise destined for extinc-
tion, may be rescued by its own phenotypic traits that allow it to cope with and ultimately
thrive in its altered environment.

















Both η and µ are functions of anthropogenic disturbance in the ecosystem,
represented by the rate of land conversion, v. Hence, this variable provides
the link between both sectors in the economy and is the means through which
the social planner characterises the trade-oﬀsb e t w e e nt h ep r i v a t ea n dt h e
public good. Ecological uncertainty increases as both µ and β increase.
2.3 The Social Planner
The social planner’s objective is to maximise a social welfare function by
setting a single policy variable, the rate of land conversion. As described in
the previous subsection, anthropogenic disturbances of biodiverse ecological
systems increase the probability of species extinction and evolutionary rescue,
but the magnitudes of these eﬀects are stochastic. As a result, the net human
impact on the environment is uncertain. While the social planner may be
risk averse regarding the ecological good, consumption beneﬁts of the private
good are assumed to be known with certainty.
The planner is assumed to have constant relative risk aversion regarding
the public good. Hence the contribution of the public good to social welfare





where ε i st h ed e g r e eo fc o n s t a n tr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o n ,w i t hε > 0 and
ε 6=1 .8 This implies that the social planner’s attitude toward losing a given
percentage of species remains unchanged as the level of biodiversity in the
ecosystem changes. A risk-averse social planner would choose to have less of
the public good with certainty over having more with uncertainty. Milgrom
8When β =1 ,t h e nWP (t)=l o gP (t).
7and Roberts (1992) show that the certainty equivalent, ˆ P(t), can be expressed
as:




where the second term on the right hand side of equation (13) represents the














The variance used to arrive at (14) applies to all β 6=0and β 6=1 .T h ec a s e
of a risk-neutral social planner is characterised by ε =0 ,w h e r eo n l yt h eﬁrst
term in (14) is relevant.
The social planner’s goal is to maximise a social welfare function which
has as arguments the present value of the certainty equivalent of the public
good and the present value of consumption along the optimal growth path,
so that:












−rt ˆ C(t)dt (17)
where r is the planner’s rate of time preference. As deﬁned above, ˆ C(t)
represents output of the private good at period t along the optimal growth
path, conditional on v. This way of expressing the welfare function allows
f o rac l e a rt r a d e - o ﬀ between separate private and public beneﬁts, and means
that the functional form of the function is fully ﬂexible. The two components,
WP and WC, are examined in turn in the following section.
3 The Two Components of The SWF
This section derives convenient formulae for the two components, WP and
WC, of the social welfare function in (15). Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 examine
8public and private good components in turn.
3.1 The Public Good
The present value, WP, of the beneﬁt (in terms of the certainty equivalent)













v + r +( 1− β)f(v)




Given that the probability of species extinction increases as the rate of land
conversion increases, that is f(v)0 > 0, the value of the risk premium is
positive for all values of v as long as 0 <β<1. Accounting for ecological
risk from land conversion therefore leads to lower public good utility over the
full range of v.
The relationship between the probability of species extinction and the
rate of land conversion is captured by the general functional form f(v). A
convenient speciﬁcation of this function, in terms of a single parameter, is:
µ = f(v)=v
θ (19)
where θ = 1, implying that the ecosystem is tolerant to small scale distur-
bance. Signiﬁcant ecological response is triggered only as the disturbance,
represented by the rate of land conversion, v, increases to high levels. The
coeﬃcient θ may be said to describe the ‘resilience’ of the system, as higher
values of θ are associated with lower values of µ. Thus, the extinction debt
incurred through land conversion is expected to be smaller the larger is θ.
3.2 Private Sector Growth
Given the choice of the constant rate of land conversion, v, it is necessary to
determine the optimum time proﬁle of consumption, denoted ˆ C (t).T h i si s















and along the balanced growth path, the ratio of capital to land remains










Substitution into equation (17) and integrating gives the contribution of




















where the capital-land ratio is again given by equation (21).
4T r a d e - O ﬀs and Policy Choice







This speciﬁcation allows for a single parameter, γ, to describe the relative
weight attached to biodiversity beneﬁts, and rules out corner solutions where
either no private good is produced or all land is immediately converted.
It is useful to illustrate the properties of the model using numerical ex-
amples. For convenience, a number of the parameters may be normalised, so
that R0 = D0 = A =1 . Production in the private sector is assumed to be
elastic with respect to land, with α =0 .7. The model emphasises the trade-
oﬀ between biodiversity, representing a signiﬁcant value of national wealth,
and agricultural production. Biodiversity hotspots, the most diverse and
therefore most valuable natural areas, are predominantly situated in devel-
oping countries. In these countries, subsistence agriculture is still common,
9The classic exogenous growth model formulation with decreasing returns to scale in
the private sector satisﬁes the Inada conditions and leads to the growth rates of private
sector variables assymptotically approaching zero as t approaches inﬁnity. For example it






































W: Gamma = 0.3






























W: Gamma = 0.3
W: Gamma = 0.1
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W: Gamma = 0.3
W: Gamma = 0.1
Figure 1: Social Welfare and Land Conversion Rate
with a high proportion of income linked to the area of land under cultivation
as opposed to modern agriculture where a larger proportion of agricultural
output is due to capital intensive inputs such as machinery and fertilizers.
Capital is assumed to depreciate at the proportional rate, δ =0 .10.
Empirical tests of the phenomenon of evolutionary rescue are rare, so little
guidance is available regarding the value of the constant β in the probability
of evolutionary rescue. Gomulkiewicz and Holt (1995) suggest low likelihoods
of such an event occurring. Therefore, in the majority of cases examined
below, β is set equal to 0.05, but the eﬀects of varying β are also examined.
Normative variables, those depending on the planner’s value judgements,
include the weight attached to biodiversity, γ, t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,r,
and the constant degree of relative risk aversion, ε. It is therefore useful to
consider the sensitivity of results to these variables.
First, an indication of the form of variations in the welfare components
i sg i v e ni nF i g u r e1 ,o b t a i n e du s i n gr =0 .05, θ =2 .0 and β =0 .05 for
ecological resilience and ε =1 .5, with other parameters as indicated above.
This value of r may be thought to be rlatively high, but sensitivity analyses





























































Figure 2: Optimal Conversion Rate and Theta
WP decreases continuously. The value of social welfare, W, passes through
the point of intersection of the two components and its global maximum
coincides with the rate of land conversion the social planner optimally chooses
to maximise the joint welfare from the public and the private good. Figure 1
shows the variation in total welfare for two values of γ, the weight attached to
biodiversity beneﬁts. The optimal value of v clearly increases as γ is reduced.
It appears from the W proﬁles that the ‘cost’ of exceeding the optimal v is
low, as each proﬁle is relatively ﬂat beyond its maximum. However, this
arises because of the relatively high discount rate used; a lower discount rate
substantially increases the cost of adopting an excessive conversion rate.10
Figure 2 shows how the optimal conversion rate varies as the degree of
environmental resilience, θ, varies, for alternative discount rates. The optimal
rate was obtained numerically, by searching for the value of v that maximises
W. Other parameters are the same as those used for Figure 1, with γ =0 .3.
Clearly, a higher discount rate produces a higher optimal conversion rate.
10The importance of interest rates within the context of economic growth has also been
noted by Rubio and Renan (1998), who ﬁnd constant land allocations to the private sector



























Figure 3: Optimal Conversion Rate and Beta
For the higher values of r and low θ ≥ 1, the optimal conversion rate falls
very slightly as θ increases. This arises because of the link between µ and η,
so that the increase in θ is associated with a reduction in η,w h i c hi sm o r e
noticeable at lower values of θ. This reduction in the probability of ‘rescue’
produces the lower optimal conversion rate. This eﬀect is less noticeable at
lower discount rates, where a longer term perspective is taken. For higher
values of resilience, further reductions in µ via increases in θ clearly dominate.
This result supports the conjecture that more resilient ecosystems can cope
with higher levels of disturbance before their ecological response, for example
in terms of the size of the extinction debt, become prohibitive to further
increase the rate of land conversion and consumption growth.
The eﬀect of varying the probability of evolutionary rescue, η, relative to
the probability of species extinction, µ, is shown by varying β in Figure 3, for
other parameters as in Figure 1, with γ =0 .3. There is little variation in the
optimal conversion rate as β is increased. At low values, the increase in η as β
increases has a dominating eﬀect on the conversion rate, which thus increases
slightly. However, for higher β values, the eﬀect on ecological uncertainty —



























Figure 4: Optimal Conversion Rate and Risk Aversion: Alternative Betas
optimal conversion rate falls as β increases further. The suggestion here that
higher values of β are associated with an optimal conversion rate that is
more sensitive to risk aversion is shown in Figure 4. Again, other parameters
a r ea si nF i g u r e1 ,w i t hγ =0 .3.T h ee ﬀect on optimal conversion rates of
a ‘living dead’ species being rescued by phenotypic evolution with greater
probability outweighs the increased uncertainty as long as the social planner
exhibits levels of risk aversion below a given threshold. Risk aversion above
the threshold implies that the added uncertainty surrounding the ecological
response to land conversion leads the social planner to opt for a more prudent
approach to natural resource development.
The eﬀect on optimal conversion rates as risk aversion is increased, for
alternative values of θ,i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e5 . 11 As expected, higher ecologi-
cal resilience is associated with higher optimal conversion rates and a lower
sensitivity to risk aversion.12
The relative risk aversion parameters considered here cover a wide range
from risk neutrality to substantial aversion. Estimates from empirical and
11Again, other parameters are as in Figure 1, with γ =0 .3.
12For values of θ close to unity, not shown in the diagram, an increase in θ is associated,
in view of the ﬁxed value of β, with a reduction in η. This means that, for lower values of





























































Figure 5: Conversion Rate and Risk Aversion: Alternative Thetas
experimental studies, ranging from 0.3 to 2.5 and reported by Dubois and
Vukina (2003) and Johansson-Stenman et al. (2001), do not relate to en-
vironmental risks. Where such risks are studied, they are limited to the
willingness to pay for risk reduction, as in Carson and Mitchell (2000), or
environmental damage compensation; see Earnhart (2000). Benartzi and
Thaler (1995) found that individuals act with more prudence if confronted
with a one-oﬀ gamble, which is more relevant to the present context. Also,
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2001) and Praag and Booij (2003) found that
relative risk aversion increases with a longer time horizon.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to examine the optimal choice of land conversion
where values, in a social welfare function, are attached both to consump-
tion of a private good and uncertain biodiversity beneﬁts arising from the
unconverted land. Extinction debt, the ecological response to environmental
disturbance, was modelled as a stochastic process, reﬂecting the consider-
15able uncertainty involved. The dynamics in the private sector in terms of
consumption and capital growth are governed by the rate of land conver-
sion from biodiversity reserve into agricultural land. Environmental quality
was assumed to appear only in the social welfare function, and not in the
production function of the private sector good.
It is widely recognised that concern for the environment acts as a restraint
on the rate of land conversion, and hence growth in the private sector.13 This
paper has concentrated on the role of ecological resilience to environmental
disturbance, uncertainty and a planner’s attitude to risk in determining the
optimal balance between economic growth and ecological conservation. It
was shown that none of these variables considered has an unequivocal eﬀect
on optimal conversion. Instead they are interlinked so that increases in eco-
logical resilience and uncertainty may lead to faster or slower optimal natural
resource development depending on the magnitude of other variables such as
the social planner’s attitude to risk and the discount rate applied. The analy-
sis demonstrated the importance of having information on the relationship
between land conversion, ecological resilience and the magnitude of the ex-
tinction debt, as changing the curvature of the ecological response function
led in some instances to almost double the optimal conversion rate. The
results were less sensitive to assumptions regarding the probability of evolu-
tionary rescue, which is fortunate given the diﬃculties involved in testing for
such processes.
Sensitivity analyses conducted to test the robustness of results showed
that the model is sensitive to normative parameters characterising the social
welfare function, such as the weight attached to biodiversity beneﬁts, the
degree of risk aversion and the choice of the discount rate. These results
reinforce the argument of Barrett (1992, p. 279) that ‘the fate of the nat-
ural environment depends as much on society’s ethical views as on positive
economic parameters’.
13See for example Gradus and Smulders (1993) who test this hypothesis using three
diﬀerent types of growth model.
16A p p e n d i x :G r o w t hi nT h eP r i v a t eG o o dS e c -
tor
This appendix derives the optimum growth characteristics of the private
good, remembering that this is considered as conditional on the rate of land






which, given the conditions (3)-(5), is subject to:
˙ K = AK(t)
1−αL(t)
α − C(t) − δK(t) (25)
where K(0) = K0 and ˙ K = dK/dt. To simplify notation, the time argument
t is henceforth omitted from the control and state variables.
The current value Hamiltonian comprises of the integral in (24) and the
capital constraint (25):
˜ H = C + m(AK
1−αL
α − C − δK) (26)






= − ˙ m + rm =( 1− α)mAK
−αL
α − mδ (28)
where ˙ m = dm/dt,a n d :
∂ ˜ H
∂m
= ˙ K = AK(t)
1−αL(t)
α − C(t) − δK(t) (29)
The transversality condition arising from the endpoint constraint is:
m(∞) > 0 and
h
ˆ K(∞) − K∞
i
m(∞)=0 (30)
where ˆ K is the capital stock that results from the optimal path at inﬁnity.
17It follows from equation (27) that the co-state variable, m,e q u a l s1 for
all t. Thus the capital constraint in equation (26) is binding at all time and










Along the optimal growth path, the ratio of capital to land remains constant.
Rearranging the third Hamiltonian condition (29) and appropriate sub-
stitution gives the optimal private good consumption, ˆ C(t),a ta n yp o i n ti n















The term in the square brackets in equation (32) is the intertemporal oppor-
tunity cost of investment on consumption. The ratio in the ﬁrst parenthesis
in (32) determines the extent of the trade-oﬀ between investment and con-
sumption. The eﬀective discount rate in the numerator favours consumption
over investment. The denominator represents the constraint on consumption
through the investment requirement, which is higher the more elastic agri-
cultural production is with respect to capital. The capital depreciation rate,
δ aﬀects consumption in much the same way: increased investment is neces-
sary to oﬀset increases in capital depreciation, leading to lower consumption
levels along the optimal path. The two exponential terms represent the eﬀect
of the binding land constraint on consumption.
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